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OIL AND GAS
THE RIGHT OF A LESSEE TO DISCONTINUE THE PAYMENT OF RENTALS WHEN THE PRODUCT OF A GAS
WELL CANNOT BE UTILIZED OFF THE PREMISES
Oil and gas leases commonly provide for the payment of a
rental for each gas well, "the product of which is transported or
used or marketed off the premises".
What are the respective
rights of the lessor and the lessee should a situation arise in which
the lessee, after diligent effort, is unable to market or otherwise
dispose of the gas at a profit? The problem may be subdivided
according to time, i. e., whether such failure occurs (a) during the
fixed term of the lease, or (b) after that term, when the premises
are being held "as long as oil or gas is produced", or "produced
in paying quantities",' or "the premises are operated for the production of oil or gas".
For purposes of this discussion, questions of forfeiture or
cancellation for breach of implied covenants diligently to explore,"
or to protect from drainage,' as well as doctrines of abandonment,'
are eliminated.
The liability of the lessee for rentals would seem to be referable solely to the language of the lease. If the lease stipulates
that the lessee is to pay for each well, the product of which is
used or transported or marketed off the premises, the unavoidable implication is that he is not to pay for any well, the product
of which is not so utilized. But, since a strictly literal interpretation of the lease would enable the lessee arbitrarily to refuse to
market the gas at a small profit (holding for higher prices), and
thereby to deprive the lessor of any remuneration, the courts have
implied a covenant binding the lessee to use reasonable diligence
and good faith in an effort to dispose of the gas at a profit.' If
'Whether or not the production is in paying quantities is left to the judg-

ment and discretion, in good faith, of the lessee. Lowther Oil Co. v. MillerSibley Oil Co., 53 W. Va. 501, 44 S. E. 433 (1903).
'Cf. Wilson v. Reserve Gas Co., 78 W. Va. 329, 90 S. E. 875 (1916) and
Johnson v. Armstrong, 81 W. Va. 399, 94 S. E. 753 (1917) with Carper v.
United Fuel Gas Co., 78 W. Va. 433, 89 S. E. 12 (1916); Note (1920) 26 W.

VA. L. Q. 248.

Cf. Trimble v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 169 S. E. 529 (W. Va. 1933).
To constitute abandonment there must be both intention to abandon and
actual relinquishment of the leased premises. Lowther Oil Co. v. miller.
Sibley Oil Co., supra n. 1.
r"Profit", means over and above the cost of marketing, although the
operator may be incurring a loss upon his entire investment.
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the lessee has done so, it would seem that he is not liable to the
lessor in an action at law for rentals payable for the "quarters"
during which no gas was or could be utilized off the premises.'
If this situation should arise during the fixed term of the
lease, the lessor quite obviously cannot secure cancellation on any
theory of expiration. If, however, the non-utilization occurs during the extension period, i. e., "as long as oil or gas is produced"
from the premises, the lessor logically may argue that the lease
has terminated. The nature of the estate, or its duration, held
by the lessee during the extension period is not clear.' It would
seem that at least in West Virginia, actual production is not necessary in order to extend the lease beyond the fixed term, as long
as the lessee is diligently exploring
But, having completed exploration and secured a well capable of producing, it is submitted
that the lessee could not continue indefinitely to hold the lease
and pay nothing for the privilege, notwithstanding that upon discovery of the gas he acquires a vested interest.'
The courts would probably hold that the lessee has a reasonable length of time within which to continue his efforts to utilize
'the gas. What should constitute a reasonable length of time might
well depend upon the particular facts and circumstances in each
case. ' However, it is believed that one year should be the maxi0Indianapolis Gas Co. v. Teters, 15 Ind. App. 475, 44 N. E. 549 (1896);
Ohio Oil Co. v. Lane, 59 Ohio St. 307, 52 N. E. 791 (1898); Roberts v. Fort
Wayne Gas Co., 40 Ind. App. 528, 82 N. E. 558 (1907); Indiana Natural
Gas Co. v. Wilhelm, 44 Ind. App. 100, 86 N. E. 86 (1908); PittsburghColumbia Oil and Gas Co. v. Broyles, 46 Ind. App. 3, 91 N.. E. 754 (1910).
The Roberts and Wilhelm cases are cited with approval in Prichard v. Freeland Oil Co., 75 W. Va. 450, 84 S. E. 945 (1914).
7 See State v. South Penn Oil Co., 42 W. Va. 80, 24 S. E. 688 (1896), at
page 102: "Nor does the addition to the term of years of the clause 'and

as long as oil or gas may be found in paying quantities' give it such in-

definite duration as makes the interest freehold in quantity; for, after the
expiration of the term prescribed (ten years), the lessee, having the option
to continue to pump if he can find oil in paying quantities, becomes a tenant
at will, which may become a tenancy from year to year on the terms of the
lease, but it is not a freehold, because its extension after the end of the term
prescribed depends upon his own will; so, according to the terms of the
instrument, that is as large an interest as the word will bear."
ISouth Penn Oil Co. v. Snodgrass, 71 W. Va. 438, 76 S. E. 961 (1912)
and Ohio Fuel Oil Co. v. Greenleaf, 84 W. Va. 67, 99 S. E. 274 (1919),
commented upon in note (1919) 26 W. VA. L. Q. 79.
0 See Simonton, The Nature of the Interest of the Grantee Under an Oil
and Gas Lease (1918) 25 W. VA. L. Q. 295.
" In Grass v. Big Creek Development Co., 75 W. Va. 719, 84 S. E. 750
(1915), an action at law to recover damages for breach of implied covenants
to protect against drainage and to develop with reasonable diligence, it was
held (syl. 9): that regard must be had to the "cost of drilling, proximity
of market, and facilities for marketing; current prices, whether high or
low; location of the lands, etc."
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mum period, from either (a) the expiration of the fixed term, assuming that there never has been any utilization, or (b) the date
upon which gas was last utilized. This would be particularly true
ffi any case in which the lease provided for an "annual" rental,
notwithstanding that it is payable in quarterly instalments. Some
consideration might also be given to the acreage embraced in the
'lease. Recent cases intimate that the lessee may continue to hold
the well and sufficient surrounding acreage, but the lessor is entitled to partial cancellation, as to the remainder of the tract.'
It may be contended that a lease which in terms provides that
the lessee may continue to hold the premises, either during the
fixed term or thereafter, without payment to the lessor, is so unfair and inequitable that a court of equity should decree cancellation. The answer to this contention will depend upon whether
the lease is regarded primarily as a contract or as a conveyance
of an interest in real property.' The notion of fairness is referable to theories of consideration and mutuality of obligation. If
consideration for the continuance of the lease, in a case in which
oil only is produced, is continued operation and the payment of
royalties, the lessor, without violence to reason, might argue that
payment of rentals is the consideration where gas only is found.
Yet, he is confronted by the provision of the lease which negatives
such a construction. On the other hand, payment of one dollar
is sufcient consideration to support all the covenants of the lease.'
It would seem, therefore, that during the fixed term, the lessor
could not complain simply because he entered into a speculative
"White v. Green River Gas Co., 8 F. (2d) 261 (C. C. A. 6th 1925); 18
F. (2d) 471 (C. C. A. 6th 1927), in which the statement is made that if
the lessee pays rental when he is not marketing the gas, such payments are
purely gratuitous. J. B. Gathright Land Co. v. Kentucky-West Virginia Gas
.Co., 65 F. (2d) 906 (C. C. A. 6th, 1933).
22 The oil and gas. lease is not strictly a "lease"
at all, but is a profit a
prendre. Upon execution of the lease the lessee gets two estates: (1) a
vested right to explore and (2) a right to produce, contingent upon discovery.
See Simonton, op. cit. supra n. 9. See Tu'FAxy, LANDLORD AN I TENANT
(1910) 160: "In view of the fact that the entrance into contractual obligations by means of 'covenants' ordinarily constitutes a most important part
of a transaction involving the creation of the relation of landlord and tenant,
it is not surprising that quite frequently courts have lost sight of the fact
that the really essential part of the transaction is a conveyance, and instead
regard it as involving the creation of contractual obligations only, frequently
speaking of the 'contract of lease' ". At p. 163: "The fundamental objection to such a definition of a lease is that it entirely ignores the commonlaw theory of a particular and reversionary estate in the lessee and lessor
respectively."
I Cf. Rich v. Donaghey, 71 Okla. 204, 177 Pac. 86, 3 A. L. R. 352 (1918)
and collection of cases, 3 A. L. R. 378.
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bargain which the tarn of events has rendered displeasing.' After
the fixed term, it is here suggested that the obligation of the lessee
to use diligent efforts to utilize the gas is a detriment suffered,
which constitutes sufficient consideration for extension beyond the
fixed term, for a reasonable length of time.
Treating the lease as primarily a conveyance eliminates problems of consideration. No consideration is necessary to support
the grant of a leasehold estate.? If the lessee has once acquired
a vested estate he cannot well be deprived of it unless the grant
is subject either to a conditional limitation or to a condition subsequent. The former could not operate during the fixed term, and
the latter could hardly be implied from non-payment of rentals,
since the lessee would thereby be subjected to the penalty of a
forfeitureP for exercising a privilege which does not render him
liable to the lessor in an action at law.
The conclusion, then, here submitted, is that during the fixed
term of the lease, the lessee may continue to hold without payment
of rentals, so long as he diligently attempts to utilize the gas.
During the extension period, in the usual form of lease, he should
be permitted to hold, upon the same basis, for a reasonable length
of time, as to that part of the acreage necessary to the proper
operation of the well, and the lessor should be awarded partial
cancellation as to the remainder of the tract.
-ROBERT

T. DorY.

"As to what constitutes unfairness in a contract, entitling to equitable
relief, see note (1924) 30 W. VA. L. Q. 293.
'sTmuwAY, op. cit., suspra n. 12, at 164: "So
far as by the term 'lease'
we refer to a conveyance by way of lease, that is, a conveyance leaving a
reversion in the grantor, it is perfectly valid without any consideration moving to the lessor. Even though any of the contractual stipulations were
invalid for lack of a consideration, this would not affect the lease so far as
it is a conveyance creating a tenancy."
"Assuming that a forfeiture could be declared, could the lessee re-enter
under the provisions of W. VA. REv. CODE, 1931, ch. 37, art. 6, §§ 19 to
26, inclusive?
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